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Not One, Not Two: Toward an Ontology of Pregnancy 
Maja Sidzinska 
Abstract 
Basic understandings of subjectivity are derived from principles of masculine 
embodiment such as discreteness. But pregnancy challenges such understandings 
because it represents a sort of splitting of the body. In the pregnant situation, a 
subject may experience herself as both herself and an other, as well as neither 
herself nor an other. This is logically untenable—an impossibility. If our discourse 
depends on discrete referents, then what paradigms of identity are available to the 
pregnant subject? What could be the pregnant subject's ontology? Eric Bapteste and 
John Dupré offer the idea that organisms are processual beings. In their view, the 
ecological interrelationships between the organisms are defining, and render them 
dynamic processes, rather than stable things. Does Bapteste and Dupré’s processual 
ontological account accommodate pregnant organisms, including pregnant subjects? 
Here, I suggest some criteria for an ontology of pregnancy. I test the processual 
account and determine whether it can accommodate the phenomenon of 
pregnancy. I find that a processual ontology captures a great deal about pregnant 
embodiment and is a significant improvement over Cartesian and anti-metaphysical 
accounts. However, in order to accommodate pregnancy, what we still need from an 
ontology is the inclusion of subjectivity. 
Keywords: ontology, feminist, gravidity, natality, pregnancy, processual, process 
ontology, feminist metaphysics, metaphysics, process 
Background and Introduction 
Imagine yourself pregnant. Are you still just yourself, but with an additional 
attribute? Are you simply “adjectived” by ‘pregnant’ as the dictionary suggests? Or 
does your pregnancy re-identify you, since there is potentially another there, within 
you? And if there is another there, can you still say that you are you? Imogen Tyler 
writes that her experience as a pregnant subject revealed to her the ways in which 
basic understandings of subjectivity are still derived from the principles of masculine 
embodiment such as self-containment, temporal stability, and singularity (Tyler 
2000, 288). But about her subjective, pregnant situation, she says: “I am both one 
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and the other. And I am equally neither one nor the other” (290).1 This is logically 
untenable—an impossibility. According to the traditional model of logic, subjects 
should not be able to simultaneously claim that they are x and ~x.2 However, to 
borrow Catharine MacKinnon’s articulation, this “impossibility” is the 
methodological expression of such a subject’s situation (MacKinnon 1983, 637). The 
very body of the pregnant subject calls the dichotomy of the subject-object relation 
into question, because, as Iris Marion Young noted, “she experiences her body as 
herself and not herself” (Young 2005, 46). The unity of one’s subjectivity and one’s 
objectivity (i.e., one’s status as an object) frays because the body, in a sense, splits, 
or at the very least changes so fundamentally that it generates questions of identity 
in the pregnant subject. Thus it is unclear whether the pregnant subject is even 
representable as such (Tyler 2000, 289). After all, we take it for granted that a 
subject may not have two bodies, that a subject is not twice-embodied.  
Historically, analytic philosophy has not even tried to represent pregnant 
organisms3—not in general, not in their capacity as subjects, and especially not in 
their capacity as simultaneous subjects and objects. And continental philosophy’s 
efforts are only very recent relative to philosophy’s long history. Part of what Tyler                                                         
1 In this context, “one” refers to the self, and “other” refers to the fetus. The same 
sentiment has been expressed by other philosophers, cited further on; I chose 
Tyler’s words because they make the contradiction the most obvious, render its 
thesis and antithesis symmetrical, and show two different levels of contradiction 
(see Footnote 2).  
2 There are multiple contradictions that are suggested here, and a number of ways 
to represent them logically. Given that T stands for Tyler, and F stands for the fetus, 
the contradictions can be represented in the following ways. 1. [T = (T & ~T)] & [T = 
(~T & ~(~T))]. This logical sentence reflects Tyler’s meaning in that it is saying that 
[(Tyler is both Tyler and not-Tyler). And (Tyler is neither Tyler nor not-Tyler)]. For an 
account of how the two conjuncts in (1) may not be equivalent, see Priest 2010; 2. [T 
= (T & F)] & [T = (~T & ~F)]. This logical sentence presumes that F is by definition 
something other than T; it clarifies that [(Tyler is both Tyler and the fetus). And 
(Tyler is neither Tyler nor the fetus)]; 3. T = 2 and T ≠ 2. This shows a mathematical 
contradiction that is also suggested by Tyler—that Tyler cannot be two things as well 
as not two things. I take Tyler’s sentence to reference all of these contradictions. All 
logical contradictions are implied when Tyler describes her experience of pregnancy, 
and are accounted for by the criteria I offer below that ontological accounts must 
meet to allow for the [logical] existence of pregnancy.  
3 Although I often refer simply to organisms, what an ontology must allow for is 
[pregnancies in] self-aware organisms—organisms qua subjects. This point is 
elaborated below. 
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wonders is how pregnantly embodied subjects and/or objects can come to exist—to 
be—in philosophical discourse that depends on logical-masculinist principles of 
reasoning. In short, what could be their ontology? 
We must take seriously Tyler’s assertion that she is both the subject and 
object of her own pregnancy. Although the contradiction in question may be 
represented as “She is both one and the other. And she is neither one nor the 
other,” taking Tyler’s subjectivity seriously is necessary because she alone can testify 
to the state of her subjectivity both before and during her pregnancy, as well as 
compare the two. In this context, I take subjectivity to reference the state of her 
own cognition, her perspectivality, her [self-]consciousness—or whatever one’s 
term of choice is for human self-awareness itself; for instance, it is the human 
pregnant subject alone who can testify whether or not her consciousness has “split 
in two” regardless of whether her body seems to have. Because of this, Tyler has 
ultimate epistemic authority about the way the phenomenon of her pregnancy 
impacts her subjectivity, her person—rather than someone “objective” as a result of 
his or her distance from the phenomenon. This should not be taken to mean that 
others may not have epistemic authority over other, especially physical, aspects of 
her pregnancy; that is, others may have epistemic authority over the organismal 
aspect of her pregnancy. Rather, it’s that when it comes to questions of, for 
instance, “how many” a thing is—and in this case “how many” a pregnant subject 
is—others don’t have access to the very thing that may shed light on the question, 
namely the subject’s very subjectivity.4  
But then how can we articulate the phenomenon of a pregnant organism 
under a methodology that, by speaking solely in terms of self and other, either 
defines the mother and fetus as mutually exclusive or collapses the two, as analytic 
philosophy would make us do?5 How can we articulate the phenomenon of a 
pregnant organism under a scientific regime that doesn’t allow its objects of study 
to know just what about them is being studied? It seems that some other 
methodology is required. If traditional accounts of the subject and/or object(s) will 
not do, what paradigms of identity are available to the pregnant organism? How can 
we attempt to represent pregnant organisms in general?  
                                                        
4 This suggests a definition of a human subject that I don’t necessarily wish to 
subscribe to. It may or may not be the case that self-conscious subjectivity is what 
defines the human subject. But that is not what is at issue here. Any definition that 
acknowledges that a subject has a certain type of access to its own subjective 
cognitive processes that other subjects that are not part of itself lack, will do. 
5 This would be as a result of analytic philosophy’s reliance on the three traditional 
laws of thought: the laws of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle. 
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In “Towards a Processual Microbial Ontology,” Eric Bapteste and John Dupré 
offer a theory of organisms as processes—as processual beings (Bapteste and Dupré 
2013). In their view, the ecological interrelationships between the traditional objects 
of biology are defining, and render them dynamic processes, rather than stable 
things. The thing-based account of the objects of biology relies on referencing 
specific moments in the life of an organism, usually moments that represent the 
mature phase of its life. The apparent stability of the objects of biology is 
maintained by various stabilizing influences or phenomena, such as homeostatic 
mechanisms, and so forth—but only up to a point. Does Bapteste and Dupré’s 
processual ontological account of organismal being(s) accommodate the 
phenomenon of pregnancy and the possibility of a pregnant organism? Or is 
something more needed?  
In this work, I present the two most relevant aspects of the processual 
account and determine whether it can accommodate the phenomenon of 
pregnancy. Can the pregnant being be a species of a processual one? I find that the 
processual ontological model accommodates a great deal of ontological information 
about pregnancy, but that ultimately, more work must be done to provide an 
adequate ontological theory that can completely account for pregnancy, particularly 
in self-aware organisms. This work must attend to the unique features of pregnancy, 
for instance its generative and transient nature—points I return to in my justification 
of the criteria for an ontology of pregnancy, as well as in the conclusion.  
This paper is intended as an exploration of just one aspect of the ontological 
conundrum presented by Tyler. I will leave aside the phenomenological aspect of 
Tyler’s line of questioning, as phenomenology’s subject and ontology’s object are 
rather coextensive here.6 This approach does not collapse pregnancy’s 
phenomenology and ontology. Rather, because of a subject’s access to her pre-                                                        
6 In searching for an ontology of pregnancy, I aim to search for an ontology that is 
inclusive of both self-aware and non-self-aware organisms. The ontological model 
should be able to accommodate both. Simply put, it should be inclusive of organisms 
and persons, as explained in later sections of this work. I introduce the problem 
phenomenologically, which presumes personhood on the part of an organism, as 
that is the term in which Tyler frames the issue when she formulates the problem, 
as well as because the subjective awareness of pregnancy in combination with an 
internalized/automatic use of reason is required to give rise to or grasp the logical 
conundrum that a pregnant organism represents. The ontological question arises 
from Tyler’s subjective experience of pregnancy because she suggests in her 
testimony that in some ways the boundaries of her subjectivity and the boundaries 
of her objectivity have remained the same, and in other ways they have changed. 
But a phenomenological exploration is reserved for another time.  
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pregnant state, she can see herself rather objectively once she knows she is 
pregnant. Put another way, her pre-pregnant state is a sort of “control” [state], to 
borrow a term from science, against which she can know the changes (or lack 
thereof) to her subjectivity relative to her embodiment, to her pregnant subjectivity 
relative to her pre-pregnant subjectivity, and to her pregnant embodiment relative 
to her pre-pregnant embodiment, rendering her impressions theoretically objective; 
she becomes the object of her own subjectivity in a different, perhaps deeper, sense 
than she was before. I can’t think of any other phenomenon that brings about such 
a state of affairs, which is why I suggest that the ontology of pregnancy must flow in 
part from its phenomenology from the top, so as to be inclusive of the pregnancies 
of subjects. Although many phenomenological questions may arise as a result of the 
experience of pregnancy, not all of them have to do with issues of what one (the 
pregnantly embodied subject) is. Those questions are bracketed off in the interests 
of focusing on the ontological discussion.  
The need to articulate pregnant being is recognized by such scholars as Luce 
Irigaray, Christine Battersby, Iris Marion Young, Talia Welsh, Elselijn Kingma, and of 
course Tyler, and is peripherally mentioned by a couple of others.7 But overall, the 
ontology of pregnancy is hardly discussed and represents a deeply understudied 
area of philosophy. As we are all the products of pregnancy, this work has universal 
relevance.  
 
Criteria for an Ontology of Pregnancy 
In order to test whether Bapteste and Dupré’s processual ontology can be 
used as a model that accommodates pregnant being, I will first spell out the 
conditions that a model must meet. Some of the conditions that follow are derived 
from feminist criticisms of traditional ontological accounts, for instance, Cartesian 
and anti-metaphysical ones. Cartesian ontologies are problematic because they 
pronounce reason and reality as isomorphic, where reason is the reason of a 
singular mind, and its material objects-to-be-known are clearly discrete (Lloyd 1984). 
The “neatness” of the male form, its well-defined boundaries, its symbolic self-
containment and independence8—all of these are necessary to and paradigmatic of 
the practice of reason, and hence to the traditional identity principle that reason 
relies upon.  
Even though philosophy generally may have moved on from simplistically 
Cartesian metaphysics of the self, for the most part, pregnancies are still thought of 
in Cartesian terms. For instance, the conception of a pregnant organism as a single                                                         
7 In particular, see Irigaray 1991a, 1991b; Battersby 1998; Young 2005; Welsh 2013; 
Kingma 2015; Wynn 2002; and Maher 2007. 
8 Relative to the female form. 
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subjectivity with two related bodies (one maternal, and the other, fetal), is often 
implicit in discussions of pregnancy; alternatively, we have presumptions of two 
organismal entities always having been independent, as in the fetal container model 
criticized by Kingma (2015). The clean theoretical cut between body, or bodies, and 
subject, or subjects, betrays Cartesian thinking. Despite the work of Leo Strauss and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for instance, which sought to undermine dualistic thinking 
about subjects and their objects, that is, in this case their bodies (Young 2005, 47), 
Cartesian paradigms implicitly dominate especially in medical or scientific settings, 
wherein the pregnant organism is sometimes referenced in terms of a unity, at 
other times in terms of a duality, and is frequently unacknowledged as a full subject. 
Cartesian ontologies flow from modes of deductive reasoning that simply cannot 
articulate the phenomenon of pregnancy because it represents a logical 
contradiction, as expressed by Tyler.  
Anti-metaphysical9 or social constructionist accounts are problematic 
because, although they have successfully challenged essentialism, they represent 
the methodology and are the terms under which pregnancy as a materially 
generative phenomenon is an impossibility. Anti-metaphysical accounts resort to 
presumptions of the duality of subjects and objects, as Cartesian accounts do, and 
again, this is the very thing that Tyler disputes. Social construction theory 
distinguishes between the construction of concepts and the construction of objects, 
and it does not deal with the emergence of material objects. Yet material objects do 
emerge (birth happens!). Therefore, although the meaning of pregnancy and even 
what constitutes pregnancy may be discussed in social constructionist terms, social 
construction theory cannot explain the genesis of embodied (material) subjects, 
which is part of what is at stake here.  
Under Western modes of reasoning, it’s impossible to point to a pregnant 
object as an object—it might be two! Or something “in between.” Notice: still a 
something, with its attendant masculinist ontological assumption of discreteness. A 
pregnant object stands outside of the set of everything, logically speaking, precisely 
because we can’t say “how many” it is. Thus, at least in an analytical sense, “it” has 
no (available) ontology because “it” is not referenceable in arguments, and yet it 
occurs; it is real.10 The unique nature of pregnancy draws the singularity of the 
generative object into question. This is precisely what Tyler’s subjective, 
phenomenological articulation of pregnancy draws out. By stating that “I am both 
one and the other. And I am equally neither one nor the other,” Tyler expresses a                                                         
9 By anti-metaphysical, I mean anti-essentialist, anti-foundationalist, and 
deconstructionist accounts.  
10 This stands whether we take a realist or anti-realist position—whether it occurs 
“really” or linguistically doesn’t impact this particular point.  
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subjective conundrum, yet it is one that I hope can be grasped rather universally. I 
speculate that one need not be pregnant and/or need not have the capacity to be so 
to imagine that if one was pregnant, an existential question might arise as to 
whether one was “one,” in terms of subjectivity and/or/relative to embodiment. I’d 
like to highlight the “was” in the previous sentence for a moment: this renders the 
question an ontological one, despite its phenomenological roots. As implied above, 
this question finds its analog in questions that attempt to establish the ontology of 
pregnant organisms in scientific terms. Here, however, we must stretch any 
ontology that science can give us to allow for the possibility that subjectivity is a 
constitutive part of pregnancy, because subjects too, are sometimes pregnant. 
In addition to my above speculation, there are multiple philosophical 
accounts of pregnancy that suggest that an impression of simultaneously being both 
one and the other, and equally neither one nor the other, is shared. Iris Marion 
Young suggests the pregnant subject is “decentered, split, or doubled,” and 
describes her own pregnancy in the same terms Tyler does (Young 2005, 46–50). 
Christine Battersby notes that, “it might be possible (when pregnant) to be both self 
and not-self” (1998, 46). Julia Kristeva writes, “Within the body . . . there is an other. 
And no one is present, within that simultaneously dual and alien space, to signify 
what is going on. ‘It happens, but I’m not there.’ ‘I cannot realize it, but it goes on.’ 
Motherhood’s impossible syllogism” (1980, 237). Thus, Tyler is not alone in her 
assertions; her statement appears to represent a shared experience. So I use her 
statement as a jumping off point in search of the answer.  
The conditions that follow are also chosen in response to Tyler’s description 
of her subjective experience of pregnancy. Ultimately, they are chosen with an eye 
to (collectively) resolving or avoiding the problems posed by traditional ontological 
accounts, as well as doing justice to pregnant organisms who are sometimes 
subjects.  
The first condition is that an ontological model must recognize mammalian 
organisms as not necessarily self-contained (Condition 1). This condition flows from 
the nature of the gestational relationship between the pregnant organism and the 
fetus,11 wherein they are connected by an umbilical cord and wherein the fetus is                                                         
11 Whether or not the fetus is an organism is up for debate. A fetus would seem to 
meet some but not all of the criteria of common definitions of “organism.” 
Regardless of whether we find that a fetus is an organism or is not an organism, its 
genesis requires explanation, as does the fact that it has the potential to develop 
into an organism. If a processual ontology of organisms is found to meet this 
condition, which it is in a subsequent section, then this question becomes rather 
moot, as we are not at (so much) liberty to pick the temporal moment at which it 
becomes an organism, since it is defined in terms of a process. 
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supported by the placenta—a specialized organ that develops in the pregnant 
organism specifically for this purpose. The pregnant entity is defined by its 
physiologically interdependent maternal and fetal aspects. 
The second condition for an ontological model of pregnancy is that it must 
allow for the temporal transiency of pregnancy (Condition 2), and thus for 
organismal identities not to be “picked out” by necessarily pointing at stable 
organismal states. The ontology that successfully accommodates pregnancy mustn’t 
be required to reflect some stable state since mammalian pregnancy is transitory 
relative to the organism’s life span. 
Thirdly, the account must not treat the pregnant organism as singular, nor as 
dual (Condition 3). Singularity is ruled out because the organism begins as such prior 
to the pregnancy, but some fundamental change occurs that makes this organism 
different than before. This change is such that, in the set of organisms, it is unclear 
whether the pregnant organism would then count as one or two instantiations of its 
type. By the same token, a dual ontology is ruled out because of the bi-directional 
sine qua non relationship between the pregnant organism and the fetus. “Both” 
depend on the “other” to constitute the status of pregnancy. This requirement falls 
in line with phenomenological accounts of pregnancy, and does justice to pregnant 
subjects as both subjects and objects of their own pregnancies. 
The fourth condition that an ontological model of pregnancy must meet is 
that it must allow for an explanation of organismal genesis (Condition 4). 
Organismal must be read to be inclusive of human organisms, and thus organismal 
genesis must be read as the genesis of potentially12 self-aware subjects. An ontology 
must allow for the fact that organisms may be partially generative of others, 
including in some cases other subjects.13 What I mean by generative in this context                                                         
12 The moment when self-awareness begins or the process by which it develops is 
open for debate. 
13 Kingma touches on this in a lecture (see Kingma 2016); she suggests that if her 
part-whole model of pregnancy is accepted, then it may be the case that persons 
give rise to persons in the case of human organisms, if one accepts animalism. In this 
work, I presume that either animalism is true, or that something very close to it is 
true. Ironically, some objections to animalism depend on pointing to the following 
inconsistency: that something may be identical to more than one thing. But this is 
one of the principles that is challenged here as a result of the reports of what 
pregnancy is like; furthermore, this “subjective” take on what pregnancy is like is 
affirmed by Dupré’s view that the moment when one organism—or process—
becomes two remains contestable. Remaining objections to animalism appear to 
presume accounts of persons who are neither ever pregnant, nor are ever born, and 
don’t grapple with feminist perspectives on embodiment or with embodied 
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is that the pregnant organism must be defined as having some kind of causal relation 
to the organism that then may emerge from it. It’s not just that the pregnant 
organism partly causes the emerging organism to be what it is; it’s that the pregnant 
organism partly causes the emerging organism to be. The claim pertains to the very 
existence of the emerging organism—think of the Heideggerian idea of being qua 
being—rather than just to organismal nature. It would be naïve to think that one 
short condition could capture such an explanation fully. But the explanation must 
allow for our latest biological understanding of organisms, as well as for the 
philosophical understanding of embodied subjectivity.  
On the biology side, such understanding involves the facts that haploid cells 
generated by the male and female bodies combine to form a zygote and are then 
implanted in the uterus of the potential mother.14 That these cells have generative 
powers when combined is an opaque phenomenon that is not fully understood.15 
We may have sophisticated understandings of what happens on a cellular level that 
gives rise to new organisms, but we can’t explain the reason it happens at all. To use 
Aristotelian terms, we can explain the phenomenon of emergence in terms of 
efficient causes, but not final causes; in other words, we can describe each falling 
domino in the causal chain, yet not know what causes the first one to fall.  
The generative property should be treated primarily as a property of the 
haploid cells. However, the potential mother’s body is a “necessary condition” for 
the phenomena of organismal genesis and pregnancy to occur.16 It seems to be a 
part of what causes the so-called first domino to fall. Furthermore, the fetal 
environment influences genetic expression, impacting phenotype. For these                                                         
cognition. A fuller refutation of animalism’s counter-arguments is saved for another 
time. 
14 In extremely rare cases, fetuses have developed outside of the uterus, but still 
within the body of the potential mother. In addition, in some cases, for instance in 
the case of trans men, the gestating organism could be said to be a father. This, 
however, depends on how one slices up or connects sex versus gender, as well as 
social versus biological roles. It is not necessarily clear whether trans men would 
wish to describe their gestative roles as maternal or as paternal. Furthermore, it is 
not clear how such a role might be described in a medical setting, or theorized in a 
scientific one.  
15 Both males and females produce haploid cells and may therefore be said to be 
generative. However, I am focusing here on the generative aspect of and the 
phenomenon of pregnancy. 
16 Although IVF technology is now sometimes used, the zygote must still be 
implanted in a uterus. This might be subject to revision if medical technology begins 
to facilitate ectogenesis—gestation outside of a maternal body. 
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reasons, an account of the pregnant organism must accommodate that the pregnant 
organism is also partly generative, rather than simply holding that haploid cells 
alone are generative. Again, a detailed account is beyond the scope of this work, but 
what an account must capture is that the pregnant organism is not merely a 
container,17 as it has been conceived throughout most of history, in which 
organismal genesis takes place, but is, at least partially, generative of other 
organisms.18  
Importantly, in the case of human pregnant organisms, the ontological 
account must accommodate subjectivity. If animalism is true, then it’s not just the 
case that organisms generate other organisms, but also that (embodied) subjects 
generate other (embodied) subjects. I’ll iterate Kristeva’s claim that science, as an 
objective discourse, is not concerned with the subject (1980, 237). Yet subjects are 
partly generated by pregnancy; presumably without pregnancy, there would be no 
subjects. Since one of my aims here is to suggest criteria for an ontology of 
pregnancy, and people—subjects—certainly are sometimes pregnant, the 
ontological model that accommodates pregnancy must accommodate their 
subjectivity.  
Thus, accounting for generativity in this context must mean accounting for 
generative subjects who produce other (sometimes generative) subjects. Masculine, 
self-contained, singular embodiment that is in perfect, coextensive sync with its 
subjectivity throughout its biological life has determined our ontologies and modes 
of reasoning thus far. But under such ontologies and modes of reasoning, 
generativity is an impossibility. Highlighting pregnancy with its attendant 
phenomenology as a case study should now push us toward ontologies wherein that 
perfect, coextensive sync is not necessary, where generativity is possible, and where 
the “inconsistent” experience of splitting-yet-cohesion has ontological weight.  
The fifth condition that an account of pregnancy must meet is that it must 
take materiality seriously. An ontological account under which pregnancy is possible 
must be, at least in part, a material account (Condition 5). Anti-metaphysical 
objections must be discarded in the context of this inquiry because a historical look 
at the evolution of human being, whether defined biologically, phenomenologically, 
or otherwise, is not contingent on its [social] linguistic articulation.19 As even                                                         
17 See criticism of the “container model” in Kingma 2016. 
18 Even if we contest that a fetus is an organism, it seems that upon birth we must 
grant that the offspring is an organism. And if that is the case, and if that organism 
has a genesis, then the questions regarding its genesis remain. 
19 If we accept the theory of evolution, human beings were not always linguistic, and 
there is no particular moment when we became so, although it is possible to point 
to moments when we certainly weren’t and moments when we certainly were.  
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deconstructionist Judith Butler notes, it is not that material existence itself is in 
dispute, but rather that its meanings are linguistically determined (Butler 2011). For 
the purpose of this work, the meanings don’t matter so much as the fact that we are 
physically here to make any meanings at all. It is the phenomenon of pregnancy, 
whatever it means, that makes that true. Pregnancy would continue to occur even if 
it had no meaning or no particular meaning; in fact, it does occur in mammalian 
organisms for which this is the case. 
To sum up, an ontological model must allow for organisms to be non-self-
contained (Condition 1), temporally transient (Condition 2), non-singular and non-
dual (Condition 3), partially generative of others (Condition 4), and material 
(Condition 5), in order to accommodate pregnancy. Other success conditions may 
need to be added at a later time. Irigaray (1991a) and Tyler both suggest that 
pregnancy is not graspable using traditional philosophical language and modes of 
argument. Even in this work, the demands of argumentation require me to 
undermine my point: to discuss the ontological relationship in question, I must refer 
separately to the whole and to parts, but by doing so I invoke the very ontologies I 
seek to challenge. My words cannot blur, yet bodies blur; our ontological model 
mustn’t blur, but must somehow accommodate a blurred phenomenon. Ultimately, 
a deeply non-analytic account may be needed, or perhaps a new method of 
linguistic referenceability20 that does not depend on traditional laws of logic or 
grammar.21 For the moment, I write within these boundaries. 
 
Key Elements of Bapteste and Dupré’s Processual Ontology  
Bapteste and Dupré’s work seeks to challenge the standard organismal 
taxonomy, which helps determine organismal ontology, and which relies on a 
hierarchical “tree” model. On this model, entities at each observed level are 
constituted by entities at a lower level. For example, molecules constitute 
organelles, which constitute cells, which constitute organs, which constitute 
organisms (Bapteste and Dupré 2013, 381). This model is also used to map 
evolutionary relationships wherein vertical genealogical inheritance is ontologically 
defining. Bapteste and Dupré find that such a model is limited in usefulness because 
it presumes that genetic and species ontologies run parallel to one another and are 
                                                        
20 Our epistemology at least partially determines our metaphysics, or at least what 
we can know about metaphysics. See Sveinsdóttir 2015. 
21 Non-classical logical, artistic, mythological, or theological representations may be 
options. 
11
Sidzinska: Not One, Not Two: Toward an Ontology of Pregnancy
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2017
exclusive of other ontological causal factors.22 On this view, all DNA Xs are Organism 
Xs, and all Organism Xs are DNA Xs, to the exclusion of any other causal/ontological 
factors, and to the exclusion of factors that don’t occur at the time scale at which 
the organism is being observed.  
Bapteste and Dupré write primarily about the microbial world, which is rife 
with horizontal genetic transfers (HGTs), the practical and symbolic importance of 
which will be discussed shortly. They assert that their analysis is adaptable to the 
ontology of organisms in general, including multicellular ones (Bapteste and Dupré 
2013, 381). In Dupré’s subsequent presentation, “Pregnancy as a Bifurcating 
Process” (2015), on the topic of processual ontology and pregnancy specifically, he 
argues that there are a couple of different ways to understand organisms. The first 
way to understand an organism is as part of a cell lineage; this is the thing-based 
interpretation of organisms. The second way to understand an organism is as a living 
system; this is the processual interpretation of organisms (Dupré 2015). Thus, 
processual ontology may be examined as a model for its capacity to account for the 
phenomenon of pregnancy in mammals. In fact, one of the questions Dupré uses to 
kick off his discussion of pregnancy is whether the pregnant mammal is one process 
or two—which is part of what is at issue here.  
Bapteste and Dupré take a decidedly ecological approach to ontology. 
Ecological is used here in its fullest sense and designates a network of interwoven 
and sometimes nested processes that cause something to be what it is. According to 
Bapteste and Dupré, organisms should be defined in terms of “how they emerge, 
are maintained and are stabilized” (2013, 381). They recognize that pointing to a 
specific temporal moment in the life of an organism based on which its ontology is 
to be defined is creating an abstraction—one that represents the organism in 
question in such a way as to obscure certain fundamental features. That, along with 
the challenge to the genetically “vertical” ontology forced by the tree model, is their 
main motivation for articulating an alternate ontology.  
A full explication of the underpinnings and significance of the processual 
account is beyond the scope of this work, as is an analysis that does justice to all of 
its details. I will therefore draw on the two theoretical features of the processual 
account that significantly distinguish it from thing-based ontological accounts. The 
first feature is its acknowledgment that causal factors are contributed at different 
timescales. In Bapteste and Dupré’s account, the appearance of ontological stability 
is generated by various steadying processes such as homeostasis on the level of 
individual organisms, and natural selection on the population level (2013, 381). In                                                         
22 For a detailed analysis of the limitations of the tree model, see Bapteste and 
Dupré 2013. The authors define causality as something that is “making a difference 
to something else” (380). 
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their view, what is perceived as stable (or not) depends largely on the temporal 
context in which it is perceived. So, for the appearance of stability, a molecular 
process may require only milliseconds, whereas an evolutionary process may 
require millennia.23 Drawing attention to this difference allows for an ontology that 
is more temporally complex. The relevant point in regard to pregnancy is that (at 
least) one temporal snapshot in the life of mammalian organisms shows their 
gravidity—yet this snapshot is almost always erased by thing-based organismal 
ontologies. Yet without this very snapshot, organisms are taken to appear on the 
scene out of nowhere, and ontological emergence—the beginning of being—is a 
now-you-see-it-now-you-don’t proposition.  
The second fundamental feature with significance for a potential ontology of 
pregnancy is the processual account’s acknowledgment of the significance of HGTs. 
In the microbial world, HGT occurs when DNA that the organism doesn’t receive 
from its parent organism is assimilated by the organism and then operates within 
the organism. For instance, bacteria may receive, via HGT, DNA that codes for the 
production of flagella, and the bacteria then produce flagella. Thus, a fundamental 
genetic, ontological change to the organism may occur that is not accounted for by 
the tree model, since the tree model identifies its objects based solely on vertically 
(“parentally”) transferred DNA. The ability of a processual ontology to incorporate 
HGT is significant because it problematizes oversimplified ontological identity 
models by allowing for the introduction of factors that were heretofore either 
invisible or seen as inadmissible as a result of the types of ontological models in use. 
Although there is no analog to HGT in the mammalian world, except perhaps in 
cases of micro- or macrochimaerism, the phenomenon of HGTs in unicellular 
organisms forces the expansion of ontological models to include non-vertical or 
epigenetic causal factors when accounting for an object’s nature, emergence, or 
existence. Epigenetic influences, that is, non-genetic influences, can, for instance, 
affect mammalian genetic expression by activating or inactivating certain genes or 
subsets of genes at certain times.24 Specifically, that non-vertical factors are now 
acknowledged to partly determine ontology is a function of the ecological nature of 
                                                        
23 The traditional view leads to the question of how to genomically define species—
common objects of ontological study. Under the tree model, it may be impossible to 
define a species’ ontology because it may be impossible to determine whether its 
genome was caused to exist “molecularly” in the last millisecond or evolutionarily in 
the last millennium. The processual view accommodates different timescales and 
therefore illuminates the fact that temporally disparate yet interwoven processes 
may be co-causal.  
24 For details, see, for instance, Ishino, Shinkai, and Whitelaw 2013. 
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processual ontology, in contrast to what I’d call the “anatomical” (i.e., static) nature 
of thing-based ontologies. 
 
Discussion 
What does this mean to the search for an ontology of pregnancy? Does a 
processual ontology make visible a phenomenon that other ontological models 
erase? Does it satisfy the requirements that were set forth?  
The first condition (Condition 1) was that an ontological model must 
accommodate a non-self-contained identity to account for pregnancy, and it seems 
that the processual account is successful in this regard. It suggests the possibility of 
blurring between organisms, the possibility of an ontology à la Merleau-Ponty’s The 
Visible and the Invisible.25 On the unicellular scale of analysis, the genetically 
“porous” nature of certain organisms that processual ontology highlights and 
accounts for challenges the oversimplified self-coherence of traditional objects of 
study. HGT, as well as epigenetic discoveries such as the impact of certain proteins 
on gene expression, undermine the idea of a crystallized DNA code that fully 
determines an object.26 Part of Bapteste and Dupré’s project was aimed at 
destabilizing the causal “players” where organismal ontology was concerned 
(Bapteste and Dupré 2013, 386). The idea that identities are not outlined in black 
like objects in a coloring book, but are rather more diffuse or permeable27 serves to 
accommodate pregnancy as it goes some way toward articulating an ontology under 
which there is the possibility of one individual organism being ontologically 
impacted—if not caused to be “what it is”—by aspects of another individual 
organism; if we wish to speak in terms of processes, then we may say that there is 
the possibility of one process being ontologically impacted by aspects of another 
process.  
Dupré’s presentation of pregnancy in the context of processual ontology 
shows that the question of how many processes occur during pregnancy is not 
settled (2015). But processual ontology facilitates the theoretical possibility of 
pregnancy in multicellular, mammalian organisms. Under a processual ontology, 
there is the theoretical potential for an object to split yet remain coherent as itself.                                                         
25 For how Merleau-Ponty’s work applies, see LaChance Adams 2014. 
26 (1) This has obvious parallels with social ontological accounts in that the 
environment, biological and social, is acknowledged to impact identity. (2) While 
other scientific theories have challenges static biological identities before epigenetic 
theories had an impact, ontological models did not necessarily evolve alongside 
them in a way that reflected new insights. 
27 Again, this biological view seems to be analogous to the views of theories of social 
construction. 
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This application of processual ontology is demonstrated in “Pregnancy as a 
Bifurcating Process” (2015), wherein Dupré challenges the identification of the 
beginning of a process (i.e., an organism on the second interpretation) with its 
vertical cause. 
The processual ontological account seems to meet the second condition 
(Condition 2), as it proposes that a more temporally holistic view of an organism 
serve as the basis of a sound ontology.28 Bapteste and Dupré specifically challenge 
traditional organismal ontological accounts on the point that they use only small 
“time slices” of the life of an organism to determine its ontology (Bapteste and 
Dupré 2013, 381). That these time slices fail to reveal a great deal of important 
information may be the problem from the perspective of the life sciences; that 
sexist value judgments inform the selection of the time slices is the problem from a 
feminist perspective. These problems are not mutually exclusive, but are rather 
intertwined. Part of what is important about mammalian organisms is the story of 
their emergence, as Bapteste and Dupré assert. I offer that another thing that is 
important is that many of the organisms undergo the phenomenon of pregnancy 
and often parturition, without which there would be no emergence, and which, in 
the politico-linguistic context of human beings, has serious social consequences. It 
seems, then, that a processual ontological account would be inclusive of the 
phenomenon of pregnancy since it wouldn’t pin ontological definitions to a 
particular (type of) snapshot of organismal life.  
Whether the processual account meets the third condition is debatable 
(Condition 3). A processual ontology seemingly diffuses the boundaries of the object 
in question in a way that illuminates an interwoven ecology. This challenges the very 
notion of a numerical quality to identity—the question of how many things an 
object “is” seemingly becomes inapplicable. So, in a sense, a processual ontology 
affirms numerical disputability. On the other hand, this characteristic of the account 
seems to enable us to sidestep the very issue in question, which is, “how many” a 
pregnant organism “is.” Thus it may undermine our ability to define what it is, at 
least under a linguistic regime wherein referents are necessarily discrete. Tellingly, 
Dupré asks whether a pregnant mammal is one process or two (Dupré 2015). He 
finds that fertilization of the ovum—the traditional “beginning” of an organism—
“may result in 0, 1, or more subsequently distinguished processes” (Dupré 2015, 22). 
Thus, even if we think in processes rather than think in things, the numerical 
question remains; instead of asking how many things she is, someone who is 
pregnant may ask herself instead how many processes she is. Although Dupré 
acknowledges that there is no unequivocal answer, he notes that “there is little 
reason to say that a pregnant mammal is two distinct processes before birth” (Dupré                                                         
28 Life-cycle approaches to organismal biology may also meet this condition. 
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2015, 8). Therefore, in regard to the third condition, the processual theory of 
organisms falls somewhat short. It is here that an account driven by the needs and 
insights of microbiology may not be particularly appropriate for mammalian 
organisms to which pregnancy is endemic, perhaps least of all to the self-aware 
subjects of pregnancy. As shown in the introduction, the pregnant subject’s 
experience of pregnancy includes (although is not exhausted by) a sense of duality.  
In a unicellular context, instances of HGT may have profound and direct 
impacts—impacts that lead scientists to question the very identity of the resulting 
organism. But while in a unicellular context, HGT suggests a theoretical possibility of 
becoming something else, for a mammalian object that is pregnant, the theory must 
suggest a possibility of becoming some number else, while remaining coherent as 
itself, as its same number, in order to meet the third condition. Since the 
requirement is that the pregnant object be non-singular and non-dual, an account 
may be needed that is somehow trans-mathematical29 or trans-logical. To the extent 
that linguistic structures are bound by logic, an account may be needed that is as yet 
unspeakable.30 
The fourth condition the processual account must meet to do justice to the 
phenomenon of pregnancy is that it must allow that its objects are partially 
generative of other, ontologically identical objects (Condition 4).31 This means that 
the ontological model must accommodate the fact that the pregnant organism in 
question may also be a subject, as is the case for humans.  
Dupré acknowledges that at some point one process becomes two (Dupré 
2015), and thus, his work can be interpreted as implying that genesis occurs. 
Pregnancy takes center stage in his presentation, so it is not erased as a 
phenomenon. But a crucial link between the pregnant mammal and the offspring 
seems not to be represented: that the offspring comes from the body of the mother, 
                                                        
29 Whether the phenomenon of pregnancy is representable using transcendental 
numbers remains an open question. 
30 This unspeakableness is demonstrated by our inability to (logically) reference 
something that is non-discrete; it has led Irigaray to suggest that language itself may 
need to be altered to accommodate “female subjectivity.” This is taken to mean that 
it would facilitate an ontology of pregnancy. See Irigaray 1995. This sentiment is 
shared by Tyler (2000). 
31 (1) Ontologically identical refers here to objects having the same ontology, not to 
objects that are identical to themselves. (2) objects must also be allowed to be 
partly generative of ontologically similar objects, if we view sexes as ontologically 
different from one another. This is because potential mammalian mothers may 
become pregnant with male, female, or intersex offspring. 
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that the maternal organism precedes the fetal-cum-organismal one.32 Dupré asks, 
“When does one process split into two?” But upon this articulation, an organism-as-
process seems to arrive on the scene out of nowhere, just as an organism-as-thing 
once did. No matter what moment we point to as the beginning of the second 
process, we are still left with the question of where—what?—the process was in the 
moment just preceding that one. In fact, Dupré writes that in organisms conceived 
of as processes, reproduction “may not take place at a particular moment” (Dupré 
2015, 19). Thus it is just as impossible to pinpoint genesis under process ontology as 
it is under static ontologies, particularly if accounting for subjectivity is required. 
Processual ontology doesn’t acknowledge that it is not merely a biological 
process that experiences a pregnancy—it is a subject.33 While organism-as-process 
apparently replaces organism-as-thing, processual ontology ignores the subject in 
that it gives no account of the genesis or development of subjects. Requiring an 
ontological model to do so may be an extremely tall order.34 Given that process 
ontology hails from the discipline of biology, rather than, say, neuroscience, 
cognitive science, sociology, psychology, or philosophy, it is rightly concerned with 
biological processes. But part of what is at stake here is the ability to give an 
ontology of human pregnancy, and it seems that while Dupré acknowledges human 
sociality as an apparent ontological factor for human organisms—insofar as he 
references society as the human organism’s ecological niche with which the 
organism necessarily interacts as possibly being on par, ontologically, with biological 
factors—the story of the genesis of subjectivity, biological or otherwise, is left out. If 
we take the human organismal process to involve the social environment, then why 
don’t we discuss the existential questioning that may arise in the pregnant subject in 
response to the phenomenon of pregnancy as a part of its ontology? 
In “Towards a Processual Microbial Ontology” (2013), Bapteste and Dupré 
write that an account must capture the phenomenon of emergence, but they make 
no mention of procreation (however it occurs, i.e., for unicellular organisms or for 
others), beyond noting that an account must include information about how 
organisms are “maintained.” However inclusively it is meant, “maintenance” does 
not seem to describe a category of behaviors specific enough to be inclusive of                                                         
32 Under the usual conditions; this may not be the case in instances of oocyte 
cryopreservation (i.e., egg freezing). Further complications to this claim may arise in 
cases of gestational surrogacy or other biomedical technologies. 
33 Although subjectivity may be conceived of as a process. 
34 But this should simply highlight a gap in metaphysics in general. Ontologies of 
subjectivity abound, but to my knowledge there is no ontology of embodied 
subjectivity that accounts for pregnancy. Recently, Kingma’s work may be leading in 
that direction. 
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procreation or pregnancy. This omission represents a latent ascription to the 
masculinist ontologies I am challenging because of the asymmetrical treatment of 
the organism that assimilates horizontally transferred DNA versus the organism that 
provides it. It is precisely this omission I reference when I claim that sexist value 
judgments inform the selection of the time-slices that come to define organisms. 
The absence of gestating organisms from the conceptual inventory used to generate 
organismal ontologies is harmful because an important biological capacity is 
erased—perhaps the most important capacity given that without it, there would be 
no mammalian organisms to speak of.  
In Bapteste and Dupré’s discussion of unicellular life, when HGT occurs, it is 
discussed from the theoretical perspective of the organism receiving the transferred 
DNA. That organism is explained to have been changed—even (re)created as a 
different object. In a mammalian context, this omission finds its analog in 
ontological accounts that include the birth of an organism but not parturition—
accounts that acknowledge that beings are born, but not that they give birth. Thus, 
in the microbial processual account, what is seen as noteworthy about organisms is 
their emergence but not their capacity to (partially) cause emergence in others.  
Dupré’s subsequent work addresses mammalian pregnancy specifically, but 
there is still only one implied reference to the fact that the parental organism gives 
rise (in whatever way) to the offspring. Overwhelmingly, organisms-as-processes are 
referred to as being intertwined, dynamic, having unclear boundaries, being 
influenced by their environment, “obligatorily symbiotic,” underdetermined, 
ambiguous; “consortia” of microbes are used as an example of an organism better 
represented by a processual ontology. This terminology doesn’t suggest that the 
mother is primary, which she is. It rather suggests a nonhierarchical relation 
between the generative and the generated organism. If at some point, one process 
simply becomes two, which process may be said to come from which? Which 
process generates the other? Again, in the context of unicellular organisms, this 
ontological relational horizontality may accurately reflect the nature of the 
relationships between certain organisms. But in a mammalian context, even if 
organisms are conceptualized as processes, they must be seen as vertically nested 
after all, if only in regard to their generativity. So the processual account does not 
quite meet the fourth condition. However, it seems that processual ontology could 
easily be expanded to be more inclusive of procreation from the theoretical 
perspective of the procreating organism. 
Lastly, I examined whether the processual ontological account takes 
materiality seriously (Condition 5). And, in a word: yes. Bapteste and Dupré are 
biologists, and their discussion of processual ontology occurs in terms of physical 
causes and effects. “Discourse,” with its attendant politics, is certainly inescapable. 
We are engaging in (political) discourse even when we discuss unicellular organisms 
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and their genetic and epigenetic interrelationships.35 And in some contexts, 
discourse shapes material reality literally.36 But even this requires that there be 
material to be shaped. That is not to say that material is somehow primary. 
Interestingly, Bapteste and Dupré’s challenge to the tree model of organismal 
ontology may be read as a challenge to the concept of vertical causes and effects 
(i.e., to reductionism) in general. This suggests that material and nonmaterial causes 
may be networked together in a web within which neither one is privileged. 
However, materiality must be included because pregnancy is not contingent on its 
articulation, as the reproduction of nonlinguistic mammals shows. As Irigaray has 
pointed out, it is against the backdrop of the maternal (material!) body that 
discourse has the option of occurring (Irigaray 1991b) since maternal bodies are the 
partial “causes” of linguistic subjects. Subjectivity is endemic to bodies, discursively 
outlined or not, but the reverse is not necessarily the case. The processual 
ontological account certainly regards bodies, although it doesn’t regard embodied 
subjects, at least not yet. 
 
Conclusion 
While the processual ontological account proposed by Bapteste and Dupré is 
a great improvement over static ontologies, more work must be done to articulate a 
robust ontology of pregnancy. To its credit, the account is ecological, and therefore 
allows for the possibility of regarding the pregnant organism as part of the 
environment necessary for emergence to occur. To the extent that it does so, it does 
not “erase” generative bodies from ontology, or from philosophy more broadly, as 
other ontological accounts have done. In fact, Dupré specifically discusses pregnancy 
in terms of processual ontology in “Pregnancy as a Bifurcating Process.” However, it 
would be a stretch to say that the processual account does justice to the significance 
of pregnancy for mammalian ontology, particularly human—subjective—
                                                        
35 For a discussion of the political commitments of sciences that seem far removed 
from “political” discourse, see Potter 1993. 
36 Social behaviors governed by gender norms may lead to gendered development 
that contradicts sexual norms. Rebecca Jordan-Young illustrates that, for instance, 
the imperative for young Orthodox Jewish men to intensively study the Talmud, 
while young women are tasked with household work, causes the women’s 
musculature to have greater average mass than that of the young men. Thus a 
nonmaterial, i.e., social, factor, partly determines a biological feature. This is in 
direct contradiction to presumed sexual physical norms that dictate that men 
generally have larger muscles, and shows that social context impacts physical 
development in that it may reverse presumed sexual norms. See Jordan-Young 2010.  
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mammalian ontology. To be fair, the account wasn’t originally theorized with this 
purpose in mind.  
What we need from ontology to be inclusive of the gestating organism, 
including and perhaps especially self-aware gestating organisms (i.e., people), is the 
theoretical acknowledgment that subjects don’t “arrive on the scene” out of thin air. 
Social construction theories seem to pick up where/when/once the embodied 
subject has arrived on the scene (i.e., once the subject has been born) but the 
details of the subject’s physical being and emergence, which are necessarily 
intertwined with its subjectivity, and its own potential generativity, are left 
unattended to.37  
If we do acknowledge the phenomenon of the emergence of embodied, self-
aware subjects, as well as the phenomenon of gestation and parturition in them, 
then we have the capacity to ask the questions whose answers should help define 
the emergent subjects’ ontologies. For instance, if we conceive of organisms 
(including organisms qua subjects) as self-contained, can there be such a 
phenomenon as pregnancy? If we conceive of organisms as temporally stable, can 
there be such a phenomenon as pregnancy? If we conceive of organisms as strictly 
singular or strictly dual, can there be such a phenomenon as pregnancy? If we 
conceive of organisms as always already “there,” can there be such a phenomenon 
as pregnancy? If we conceive of organisms as disembodied, can there be such a 
phenomenon as pregnancy? The answer to these questions is no. Therefore, if we 
assume that the phenomenon of pregnancy is (metaphysically) real—that pregnancy 
is something that occurs, then an ontology must be articulated under which it is 
possible. The requirements I have set forth are intended to guide such an ontology.  
Furthermore, an ontological explication is needed that is sensitive to the 
particularities of linguistic beings and that accounts for the phenomenological 
complications illustrated by Tyler. As discourse is generated by interrelated subjects 
and in turn (partly) generates our subjects, our ontologies must take the 
perspectives and experiences of pregnant subjects more seriously. This is especially 
pressing in light of a patriarchal discursive context—a context within which it is 
difficult to win the position of a full subject for the pregnantly embodied, as 
evidenced by the profound regulation, ideologically informed, of pregnant bodies. 
This is one of the more obvious ways that a given ontology of pregnancy has 
implications for the ethics and politics of pregnancy. “The pregnant” as a social 
group are often faced with discrimination, beyond the extent to which they belong 
to other marginalized groups (e.g., potentially women, trans men, and the disabled). 
Ontologies must be generated under the terms of which pregnancy and subjectivity 
is not a theoretical impossibility. We must create ontological models that can                                                         
37 Again, I don’t presume that materiality is primary, simply that it’s necessary. 
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capture or illustrate pregnancy, not just because they must be able to mirror the 
actual phenomenon of pregnancy as closely as possible for philosophy’s or science’s 
sake, but also because of the ethical and political consequences that they help to 
usher in. 
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